The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011 by Secunda, Paul M.
Marquette University Law School
Marquette Law Scholarly Commons
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1-1-2012
The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of
2011
Paul M. Secunda
Marquette University Law School, paul.secunda@marquette.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub
Part of the Law Commons
Publication Information
Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011, 27 ABA J. Lab. & Emp. L.
293 (2012). Copyright © 2012 American Bar Association. This information or any portion thereof
may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any means or downloaded or stored in an
electronic database or retrieval system without the express written consent of the American Bar
Association.
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Marquette Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
megan.obrien@marquette.edu.
Repository Citation
Secunda, Paul M., "The Wisconsin Public-Sector Labor Dispute of 2011" (2012). Faculty Publications. Paper 603.
http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/facpub/603
293 
The Wisconsin Public-Sector 
Labor Dispute of2011 
Paul M. Secunda* 
I. Introduction 
On Valentine's Day, February 14, 2011, the new conservative Re-
publican Governor of Wisconsin, Scott Walker, dropped a "bomb."1 He 
publicly introduced a "budget repair bill," Senate Bill 10,2 to limit 
state public-sector unions' ability to bargain collectively with their em-
ployers over wages, benefits, and other terms and conditions of work. 
This anti-collective bargaining bill, later known as Wisconsin Act 10, 
was supposedly a necessary reaction to the effects of the global eco-
nomic crisis on the state budget. 3 Yet, to many Wisconsinites, the Gov-
ernor's actions appeared to be an exercise in political retribution 
rather than budgetary restraint. 
What was so surprising was not only the unprecedented attack on 
public-sector bargaining, but that such action did not square at all 
*Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. I am indebted to 
Sophie Robin-Olivier and Pascal Lokiec for organizing the Round Table at the Universite 
Paris Ouest Nanterre Ia Defense on June 3, 2011, which led to the drafting of this paper. 
I also thank Marty Malin for his efforts in reviewing this article. All errors or omissions 
in this paper are mine alone. Disclosure: the author informally advised, without compen-
sation, Wisconsin public-sector unions and their law firms on litigation strategy and pro-
test tactics during 2011. 
1. See Wisconsin Gov. Scott Walker Says He Campaigned on His Budget Repair 
Plan, Including Curtailing Collective Bargaining, PoLITIFACT Wrs. (Feb. 22, 2011), http:// 
www.politifact.com/wisconsinlstatements/2011/feb/22/scott-walker/wisconsin-gov-scott-
walker-says-he-campaigned-his- ("[A] conversation surfaced between Walker and a per-
son impersonating Walker campaign contributor and industrialist David Koch. In an 
audiotape released Feb. 23, 2011, Walker compares his union plan to a history-making 
act and portrayed his union plan as a 'bomb.'"). The transcript of the prank call can be 
found at: http://www.jsonline.com/blogs/news/116751499.html. See also Wis. Educ. 
Ass'n Council v. Walker, 11-cv-428-wmc, 2012 WL 1068790, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 
2012) ("With the passage of 2011 Wisconsin Act 10, denominated the "Budget Repair 
Bill," the State of Wisconsin took a sweeping right turn from a half century of develop-
ments in the rights of its public employees to unionize, collectively bargain and collect 
union dues."). 
2. 2011 Wis. Act 10, http://legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/data!JR1SB-1l.pdf(last visited 
Jan. 30, 2012). 
3. See A. G. Sulzberger & Monica Davey, Union Bonds in Wisconsin Begin to Fray, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/22/us/22union.html ("Mr. 
Walker, the new Republican governor who has proposed the cuts to benefits and bargain-
ing rights, argu[es] that he desperately needs to bridge a deficit expected to reach $3.6 
billion for the coming two-year budget."). 
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with the positive history of public-sector labor relations in Wisconsin.4 
In 1959, Wisconsin was the very first state to enact public-sector 
bargaining laws5 similar to those provisions adopted under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. 6 Yet, Governor Walker maintained that 
there was a short-term deficit of about $140 million through June 30, 
2011, and a long-term deficit of some $3.6 billion.7 Walker believed 
those deficits could be more quickly erased by severely disabling pub-
lic-sector union bargaining power. 
However, the economic conditions surrounding the recession did 
not require enactment of Act 10. While the law certainly had economic 
and social implications, its motivation appeared to be largely a matter 
of partisan politics. Unions, whether public or private, are democratic 
organizations that provide workers a collective voice in society and in 
the workplace. They also act as a countervailing force to employers, 
employer organizations, and governments that promote business in-
terests at the expense of working people. In other words, Act 10 
appeared to be a political initiative by American conservatives to 
undermine unions as the champion of lower- and middle-class voters 
and to aggrandize their own political power in the process. The fact 
that similar attacks against public unions took place simultaneously 
across the country suggests conservative anti-union groups orche-
strated these reforms. Indeed, Wisconsin set the tone for similar anti-
collective bargaining legislative movements in the public sector in 
Florida, Indiana, Nevada, Michigan, and Ohio.8 
4. See Kevin M. Kniffin, Organizing to Organize: The Case of a Successful Long· 
Haul Campaign for Collective Bargaining Rights, 36 LAB. STUD. J. 333, 334 (2011) ("In 
the case of Wisconsin, the state's rich history of union organizing contrasted sharply 
with the newly elected governor's proposal and-undoubtedly-played a supporting role 
in the mass actions that became common national news stories."). 
5. See Jason Stein & Patrick Marley, Walker Budget Plan Would Limit State Un· 
ions to Negotiating Only on Salaries, Mn,WAUJ<EE J. SENTINEL (Feb. 10, 2011), http://www. 
jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/1157267-54.html ("Unlike unions of private-sector work-
ers, which are governed by federal law, state and Joca1 unions in Wisconsin are largely 
govemed by two 40-year-old state laws .... State unions are covered under the State 
Employment Labor Relations Act [Wts. 8TA1~ §§ 111.80-111.94], and school and local gov-
ernment unions are covered under the Municipal Employment Relations Act IWts. STAT. 
§§ 111.70-111.77]."); see also Kniffin, supra note 4, at 336 ("With a history that includes 
ligures such as 'Fighting Bob' La Follette along with policy innovations such as unem-
ployment insurance and workers' compensation, Wisconsin has often been recognized as 
'a Progressive showcase for social legislation.'") (citations omitted). 
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (2006). 'fhe NLRA only applies to private-sector workers, 
not to public-sector workers. I d. § 152(2). 
7. See Stein & Marley, supra note 5. 
8. See Editorial, Gov. Walher's Pretext, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www. 
nytimes.com/2011/02/18/opinion/18fril.html; see also Kniffin, supra note 4, at 334 
("[B)oth proponents and opponents of the governor's proposa1 to &·ode coUective bar· 
gaining rights presumed that Wisconsin's legislature and governor WCI'e establishing a 
new 'test' pattern that would influence actions in other states (e.g., Ohio).' ). For a sur-
vey of state enactments, see Martin H. Ma1i.n, The Legislative Upheaual in Public-
Sector Labor Law: A Search for Common Elemer1ts, 27 A.B.A. J. LAa. & EMP. L. 149 (2012). 
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More specifically, Walker's claim that Act 10's anti-collective bar-
gaining approach was required to balance Wisconsin's budget is belied 
by two unassailable facts. First, there were a number of provisions in 
the law including an annual union recertification requiJ·ement and an 
anti-dues checkoff provision, which had absolutely nothing to do with 
cost savings.9 Second, and perhaps even more tellingly, when Act 10 
was finally enacted, Walker and his allies in the legislatUTe employed 
a legislative procedure which could only be utilized if Act 10 did not 
have any impact on state fiscal policy. In short Governor Walker used 
the economic crisis, and, more specificaUy Wisconsin's budget situa-
tion, as a ruse to enact a punitive bill against public-sector unions. 
Although unions and their allies have drafted, and continue to 
draft, procedural and substantive legal challenges to Act 10 based on 
state open meeting laws and constitutionally-based freedom of speech 
provisions and Equal Protections provisions, these legal challenges, 
with some notable exceptions, have been largely unsuccessfu1.10 The 
subsequent loss of workplace rights not only adversely impacts public-
sector workers, but also the citizens of Wisconsin, who will be stuck 
with a demoralized and likely less effective public-sector work force. 
II. The Remarkable Story Behind the Enactment 
of Wisconsin Act 10 
When Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker announced his intention 
to hold an emergency budget repair session to address the state's 
short-term and long-term budget deficit, some observers were taken 
aback by his proposed radical departure from past labor relations 
practices. But as Walker freely admitted, and given Walker's notoriety 
as being an ardent opponent of public-sector unions as the former Mil-
waukee County Executive, one would have had to have been asleep 
not to see this move coming. 11 Wall<:er argued that overly-generous labor 
9. Indeed, in striking down the recertification and anti-dues checkoff provisions 
for non-public safety employees, the district court found that there was little to no con-
nection between Act lO's asserted justifications and these plainly punitive provisions. 
See Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 11-cv-428-wmc, 2012 WL 1068790, at *1-2 (W.D. 
Wis. Mar. 30, 2012). 
10. Though initially successful at trial, a divided Wisconsin Supreme Court over· 
turned the open meeting law challenges. See State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N. 
W.2d 436, 438 (Wis. 2011). The Ozarme decision is currenUy the subject of a m.otion for 
relief from judgment. See District Attorney's Motion for Recusal of Justice Michael 
Gableman and for Relief from Judgment, State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, No. 
2011AP000613-LV (Wis. Dec. 30, 20ll). As far as the Equal Protection and free speech 
challenges, the District Court for the Western Disb·ict of Wisconsin upheld the anti-
collective bargaining provisions, but enjoined the dues checkoff and -recertification provi-
sions. See Wis. Educ. Ass'" Council, 2012 WL 1068790, at "'3-4. 
11. At a February 22, 2011, press conference, Walker stated that, "[t]he simple 
matter is I campaigned on (passing anti-collective bargaining legislation] throughout 
the election. Anybody who says they are shocked on this has been asleep for the past two 
years." See POLITIFACT W1s., supra note 1. ln Mru·ch of 2010, then-Milwaukee County 
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contracts, which he asserted gave 200,000 Wisconsin public workers lu-
crative salaries, pension benefits, and health insurance, had finally 
taken an insuperable financial toll on the state.12 
Walker had the advantage of Republican majorities in both the 
Wisconsin State Senate and the General Assembly and sought to fast-
track Act 10. Although the majority was smaller in the Senate, Repub-
lican leadership thought that Walker could propose his plan without 
negotiating with Democrats and ram his bill through both chambers. 
The Democrats in the legislature, for their part, made it clear that the 
proposed "budget repair bill" really had nothing to do with fixing the 
state's budget and characterized the bid as an unacceptable attack on 
public unions. 13 Indeed, Act 10 would strip the rights of most public 
employees to bargain over most terms and conditions of employment. 
As far as collective bargaining, public workers were still permitted 
to bargain over wages, but such bargaining was limited to no more 
than the year's inflation rate. 14 If the public employees wanted wage 
increases beyond the rate of inflation, they would have to initiate a 
costly and time-consuming statewide referendum. 15 Additionally, in a 
move that many thought was aimed to divide and conquer public-
sector unions, Walker conspicuously excluded public safety officers 
(i.e., police, firefighters, and paramedics) from coverage under Act 10.16 
Executive Walker asserted that a financial emergency allowed him to lay off twenty-six 
unionized courthouse security guards and contract the work to a private company. Yet, 
the County Board had rejected the outsourcing idea just months before Walker's unilat-
eral action. Rejecting Walker's asserted financial emergency, in January of 2011, an arbi-
trator reinstated the security guards with backpay. Steve Schultze, Milwaukee County 
Must Offer to Reinstate Courthouse Security Guards, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Jan. 10, 
2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/1132124 79 .html. 
12. Later studies of public-sector compensation show that public-sector workers 
make less in compensation in Wisconsin than similarly-situated private-sector workers. 
See Jeffrey H. Keefe, Are Wisconsin Public Employees Over-compensated?, 290 EcoN. 
PoL'Y lNST. 1 (Feb. 10, 2011), http://epi.3cdn.neU9e237c56096a8e4904_rkm6b9hnl.pdf; 
see also Jeffrey H. Keefe, State and Local Public Employees: Are They Overcompen-
sated?, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 239 (2012). 
13. See, e.g., Scott Walker's Top Ten Lies, MARK PaeAN (Feb. 19, 2011, 6:52 PM), 
http://markpocanwi.blogspot.com/2011/02/scott-walkers-top-ten-lies.html. Mark Pocan 
represents the 78th District in the Wisconsin State Assembly. 
14. Id. The inflation rate is calculated by measuring the Consumer Price Index for 
a year's period ending on a date 180 days prior to the expiration of the contract. Thus, 
for contracts ending March 31, 2012, the maximum possible increase is 2.65%; for con-
tracts ending June 30, 2012, the maximum possible increase is 3.16%. Consumer Price 
Index Calculation Developments and Chart, Wis. EMP. REL. CoMMISSION (Mar. 19, 2012), 
http://werc.wi.gov/selected_press_releases_and_werc_world_articles.htm#pi_developments_ 
and_chart. 
15. Stein & Marley, supra note 5. 
16. Ezra Klein, What Is Actually Being Proposed in Wisconsin ?, WASH.PosT.COM 
(Feb. 18, 2011), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/ezra-klein/2011/02/what_is_actually_ 
being_ propose.html. While Act 10 permits "public safety officers" to bargain collectively, 
its definition of "public safety officer" excludes certain law enforcement officers. For ex-
ample, under Act 10, officers employed by the Wisconsin State Capital Police and Uni-
versity of Wisconsin-Madison Police Department are not considered public safety 
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If those were the worst parts of Act 10, that would have been 
quite enough. However, there were a number of clearly punitive provi-
sions that made it more difficult for public-sector unions effectively to 
organize their workers. Chief among these punitive provisions were 
annual recertification provisions and anti-dues checkoff provisions.17 
The annual recertification provisions required already-existing unions 
annually to recertify that they continued to represent a majority of the 
employees. Snuck into this provision was the harsh condition that not 
just a majority of those voting had to vote for the union, but at least 
51% of all employees, voting or not, had to vote for recertification.18 
This bargaining-unit-wide majority provision made it much more dif-
ficult for unions to be recertified as the representative of their 
employees.19 
The anti-union dues checkoff provision makes it unlawful for pub-
lic employers to withhold monthly union dues from employees' pay-
checks. 2° For administrative convenience, dues checkoff provisions 
had been a staple of both private-sector and public-sector collective 
bargaining contracts. Without the ability to collect union dues in this 
efficient manner, under Act 10, unions will have to spend more of their 
time tracking down members to collect dues and less time on everyday 
union duties such as processing grievances.21 
officers, making them subject to Act 10. See State Agents, DNR Wardens Not Exempt 
From Walker Cuts, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Feb. 18, 2011), http://www.jsonline.com/news/ 
statepolitics/116502363.html (noting distinction between certain classes of law enforce-
ment officers). 
17. Klein, supra note 16. 
18. Act 10 requires unions representing general employees, but not those repre-
senting "public safety" employees, to undergo annual automatic recertification elections 
to retain their status as the certified bargaining representatives, regardless of whether 
any represented employee actually seeks a vote. See 2011 Wis. Act 10, §§ 242, 289, 9132, 
9155, http://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/2011/related/acts/10.pdf. A union subject to a recer-
tification election under Act 10 is decertified unless at least fifty-one percent of those eli-
gible to vote cast ballots in favor of retaining the union. Id. § 242. 
19. As it turned out, many unions decided not to recertify and took on a more infor-
mal association status. See Scott Bauer, Wis. Unions Decide to Skip Recertification Votes, 
BosTON.COM (Sept. 23, 2011), http:l/articles.boston.com/2011-09-23/news/30194694_1_ 
wisconsin-unions-recertification-votes-collective-bargaining. But see Matthew DeFour, 
Nearly All State Teachers Unions Without Pact Seek Recertification, Wise. ST. J. (Oct. 13, 
20 11), http://host.madison.com/wsj/news/local/educationllocal_schools/article_14 7 50bca-
ffi1e-lleO-b9d0-001cc4c002eO.html?ixzz1e5vF02YS ("Of 156 local teachers unions in 
school districts that did not extend a collective bargaining agreement for this year, 144-
all but 12-filed with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission to hold votes 
later this fall."). 
20. Act 10 prohibits state and municipal employers from deducting union dues for 
employees, including for employees who desire the deductions and present their employ-
ers with written authorizations. See 2011 Wis. Act 10, §§ 58, 227, 298, http://docs.legis. 
wisconsin.gov/201llrelated/acts/10.pdf. 
21. One of the plaintiffs in the federal lawsuit against Act 10, the Wisconsin Edu-
cation Association, estimated "that the loss of an automatic dues deduction option for its 
voluntary members will amount in an additional $375,000 reduction in the portion of its 
dues contributions set aside for certain types of political activity." Wis. Educ. Ass'n 
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Many Wisconsinites were outraged by the Governor's proposal. 
There were massive demonstrations throughout February and March 
of 2011 in Madison, with as many as 100,000 protestors marching on 
the State Capitol to show their displeasure with Walker's attack on 
public unions. 22 The protests in support of public-sector bargaining 
rights were not limited to Wisconsin,23 and they received international 
attention. 24 
Meanwhile, Democratic members of the two houses of the Wiscon-
sin Legislature undertook different strategies to prevent a final vote on 
the bill. Democratic Assembly members, vastly outnumbered, sought to 
introduce endless amendments to make their Republican colleagues 
take unpopular votes, but also to stall a vote on the final bill. Although 
this approach had some success, Act 10, unmodified by any amendment, 
was passed easily in the Republican-controlled Assembly. 
In the more closely divided Senate, quite a different series of 
events unfolded. In that chamber, Republicans held a nineteen to four-
teen majority over Democrats. However, because in its initial form the 
budget repair bill included concededly fiscal measures, a sixty percent 
supermajority vote was necessary for passage. This required that at 
least twenty senators vote for the bill. Not only would the Democratic 
state senators not agree to support Act 10, they physically fled from 
Wisconsin to the neighboring state of Illinois, hoping to ensure that 
there would be no quorum to act on the Governor's budget repair 
bill. 25 Republicans responded by calling on the state police to round up 
Council v. Walker, 11-cv-428-wmc, 2012 WL 1068790, at *6 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2012) 
(emphasis in original). When the New York City MTA transportation union lost its ability 
to use dues checkoff in 2005-06, the President of the Transport Workers Union swore in 
an affidavit that ninety percent of the Union's income came from dues checkoffs from em-
ployees. Because of the loss of the dues checkoff, the MTA Union had to have its staff focus 
almost exclusively on collecting dues. See MTA Bus Co. v. TWU, No. 2005-37468, 2005 WL 
6242982 (N.Y Sup. 2005) (Trial Motion, Memorandum and Affidavit) ("Our staff has been 
deployed to the field in an aggressive campaign to push our members to pay their dues .... 
In spite of these efforts, we have experienced a significant drop in income."). 
22. See James B. Kelleher, Up to 100,000 Protest Wisconsin Law Curbing Unions, 
REUTERS (Mar. 12, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/03/13/usa-wisconsin-idUSN 
1227540420110313. This was as large as the biggest crowd of protestors in Madison 
during the Vietnam War; see also James Kelleher & David Bailey, Largest Crowds Since 
Vietnam War March in Wisconsin, REUTERS (Feb. 26, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2011/02/26/us-wisconsin-protests-idUSTRE7104F420110226. 
23. Joe Newby, Thousands Protest in Los Angeles in Support of Public Sector Un-
ions, EXAMINER.COM (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.examiner.com/conservative-in-spokane/ 
thousands-protest-los-angeles-support-of-public-sector-unions. 
24. See, e.g., Roger Wilkinson, Wisconsin Unions Rally for Rights, AL-JAZEERA (Feb. 
20, 2011), http://english.aljazeera.net/video/americas/2011/02/2011220115031136309.html 
("In the state of Wisconsin, roughly 100,000 people turned up for a fifth straight day of 
protests. Public sector workers accuse the state's Republican governor of using the [finan-
cial] crisis as a reason to attack their union rights."). 
25. Andrea Billups, Wis. Dems Flee to Avoid Anti-Union Vote; Other States Eye Si-
milar Measures, WABHINGTONTIMES.COM (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.washingtontimes.com/ 
news/20 11/feb/17 /wisconsin-democrats-flee-avoid-anti-union-bill-vot/?page=all. 
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the lawmakers and bring them back to Madison, but the state police 
had no power to bring the Democratic state senators back from 
Illinois.26 
Unable to goad the Democratic state senators back to Wisconsin, 
Governor Walker and his Republican allies in the legislature devised a 
new plan they believed would not require a supermajority vote on 
Act 10.27 On March 9, 2011, with little notice, the Senate majority lea-
der, Scott Fitzgerald, quickly held a special conference committee 
meeting with representatives from the Wisconsin Senate and Assem-
bly. He introduced a new version of the bill, which was said not to have 
any fiscal provisions and, therefore, needed only a normal majority 
vote. Although the Democrats present at this conference committee, 
including Assembly Minority Leader Peter Barca, vehemently objected 
to this unusual legislative process, the amended bill was first passed 
by the conference committee and then by simple majorities in the Senate 
and the House.28 On March 11, 2011, Governor Walker signed Act 10 
into law with all ofthe same anti-collective bargaining provisions. 
Ismael Ozanne, the Democratic district attorney for Dane County, 
immediately challenged Act 10.29 The lawsuit alleged that enactment 
of Act 10 violated Wisconsin's open meetings law,30 which requires 
that the public and interested parties be given adequate notice before 
legislation is considered. The lawsuit maintained that such notice was 
lacking under the open meetings law and, therefore, the legislative 
process had to be redone with proper notice. On May 26, 2011, the 
trial court voided Act 10, finding that the manner of the law's enact-
ment violated the open meetings law.31 
26. Id . 
27. Patrick Mal'ley & Lee Bergquist, With Democrats Absent, Republicans Ad-
vance Collective Bargaini11g Changes, M TLWAUJU:E J. SENTINEL (Mar. 9, 2011), h ttp://www. 
jsonline.com/newslstatepoliti.cs/11'7656563.html ("Just before the Senate vote, a commit-
tee stripped some fi nancial elements from the bill which they said allowed them to pass 
it with the presence of a simple majority. The most controversial parts of the bill remain 
intact."). 
28. Id. 
29. Dane County is the county in which Madison, the capital of Wisconsin, is 
located. 
30. See W1s. S·rAT. §§ 19.31-.39 (2011). 
31. See Oznnne v. Fitzgerald, No. 11-CV-1244, 2011 WL 2176815 (Wis. Cil'. May 26, 
2011 ). During this srune time period, conse1vative supporters of Walker were seeking to 
silence ct·it ics of Act 10 through public record act requests seeking the emails of promi-
nent public university professors. The most notorious example of such tactics was by 
the Wisconsin Republican Party, which sought to gag the expression of University of 
Wisconsin-Madison history professor William Cronon. Dr. Cronon had written an op-ed 
in the New York Times about the ongoing dispute surrounding the Wiscons in budget re-
pair bill. Based on the fact that similar conservative legislation was percolating in many 
state legislatures throughout the country, Dr. Cronon surmised that the Amel'ican Legis-
lative Exchange Conference (ALEC) and other conservative advocacy groups bad crafted 
Walker's anti-union legislation. Dr. Cronon did not draw any ultimate conclusions on 
these matte.rs but only suggested that other people conduct research to determine what 
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The Act 10 story subsequently became even more convoluted and 
bizarre. Justice David Prosser of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, a con-
servative on the seven-member court, had come up for reelection for 
another ten-year term. Including Justice Prosser, there were four con-
servative Justices and three progressive Justices. If Justice Prosser 
lost his election, the court would flip to a progressive majority, and the 
thought was that the court would uphold the trial judge's decision. As 
it turned out, Justice Prosser barely defeated his progressive challen-
ger after an April 6, 2011 formal recount, keeping a four-to-three con-
servative majority.32 
In June of 2011, just two months after his reelection, after 
a heated argument over whether the court should uphold the open 
meetings law violation, allegations arose that Justice Prosser had at-
tempted physically to choke a fellow Supreme Court Justice, progres-
sive Justice Ann Walsh Bradley.33 Although Justice Prosser was later 
cleared of any criminal conduct,34 many people wondered what impact 
this event had on the Wisconsin Supreme Court's June 14, 2011 four-
role ALEC and these other conservative clearinghouses had played in the Wisconsin 
labor crisis. The University of Wisconsin was subsequently served with a public records 
request from the Wisconsin Republican Party that demanded all of Dr. Cronan's univer-
sity emails that included certain political terms (including Scott Walker, recall, Republi-
can, and collective bargaining) from January 1, 2011, and beyond. John Nichols, Wiscon-
sin GOP Seeks to Silence a Distinguished Dissenter. McCarthyism Is Back, THE NATION 
(Mar. 25, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/blog/159489/wisconsin-gop-seeks-silence-
distinguished-dissenter-mccarthyism-back. At the time, I criticized the Wisconsin GOP 
in my own blog post, concluding: 
[T]he Wisconsin Republican party is seeking to chill [Dr. Cronan's] speech in 
order to further self-serving political aims. The intent of such requests ap-
pears to be nothing less than to suppress efforts to disseminate important in-
formation about whether out-of-state conservative organizations are funding 
legislation being pushed currently by the Wisconsin governor. 
Paul M. Secunda, The Wisconsin Republican Party Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks, 
ACS BLDG (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-wisconsin-republican-
party-doth-protest-too-much-me thinks. 
32. Larry Sandler & Patrick Marley, Prosser, Kloppenburg Virtually Deadlocked as 
Supreme Court Race Remains Tight, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www. 
jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/119303544.html ("Interest groups on both sides had por-
trayed the election as a referendum on Gov. Scott Walker's agenda and particularly on a 
controversial law sharply restricting public employee unions. Conservatives backed 
Prosser, and liberals supported Kloppenburg, even though the candidates themselves 
insisted they were politically neutral."). 
33. Reid J. Epstein, Cops Look Into David Prosser "Choke Hold" Charge, PoLITICO 
(June 27, 2011), http://www.politico.com/newslstories/0611/57835.html ("Wisconsin Su-
preme Court Justice David Prosser is again in the middle of a partisan storm-this time 
over shocking allegations he choked a colleague in her chambers during an altercation 
over Gov. Scott Walker's union-busting budget bill."). 
34. As this article goes to press, the Wisconsin Judicial Commission has a pending 
ethics complaint against Justice Prosser for his conduct towards Justice Bradley. 
See John Israel, Justice PI'Osser Attempts To Kill Ethics Case Against Him By Asking All 
Colleagues To Recuse Themselves, THINKPROGRESS (Mar. 21, 2012, 11:15 AM), http://think 
progress.org/justice/2012/03/21/448919/prosser-attempts-to-kill-ethics-case/?mobile=nc. 
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to-three ruling to vacate the judgment of the trial court and permit 
Act 10 to go into effect. 35 Justice Prosser wrote a vitriolic concurrence 
providing a pro-Walker tilt to the political background of Act 10 and 
reasons for finding no violation. 36 Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson 
wrote a scathing dissent which took Justice Prosser and the majority 
to task for rushing publication of the decision for political reasons.37 
In the end, Act 10 went into effect on June 28, 2011.38 
Following affirmation of Act 10's lawful enactment, yet another 
drama was playing out. Union supporters had vowed to seek the recall 
of Republican state senators who had voted to strip public-sector col-
lective bargaining rights. Wisconsin recall laws only permit recalls to 
be filed against those who have been in office for at least one year 
since their last election.39 This meant Governor Walker could not initi-
ally be subjected to recall, nor could any members of the State Assem-
bly who had all just been reelected to a new two-year term in Novem-
ber 2010. Instead, six Republican and three Democratic state senators 
faced recall efforts in July and August of 2011.40 The outcome was a 
plus-two gain for Democrats, as all Democrats retained their seats 
and four out of the six Republicans targeted retained theirs. The recall 
efforts reduced the Republican majority to a wafer thin seventeen to 
sixteen.41 Of course, these first recall efforts did not repeal or amend 
Act 10. 
35. State ex rel. Ozanne v. Fitzgerald, 798 N.W.2d 436 (Wis. 2011). 
36. I d. at 447. Justice Prosser's concurrence noted: 
The circuit court concluded that the legislature should have provided public 
notice of the special session conference committee 24 hours in advance. The 
court did not acknowledge that thousands of demonstrators stormed and oc-
cupied the State Capitol within a few hours of the notice that a conference 
committee meeting would be held. 
37. Id. at 451 (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ("Justice Prosser's concurrence is 
longer than the order. The concurrence consists mostly of a statement of happenings. It 
is long on rhetoric and long on story-telling that appears to have a partisan slant. Like 
the order, the concurrence reaches unsupported conclusions."). 
38. See Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 11-cv-428-wmc, 2012 WL 1068790, 
at *4 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2012). 
39. See Recall Elections, Wis. DEP'T OF ELECTIONS, http://elections.state.wi.us/ 
docview.asp?docid=11827 &locid=4 7 (outlining recall procedures). 
40. Republicans ran fake "Democrats" in the Democratic recall primaries to delay 
the process. Wisconsin Recall Elections: Six Fake Democrats Force Primaries in Recall 
Races, HUFFPOST PoL. (July 12, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/07/12/wisconsin-
recall-elections_n_895537.html. Undeterred, Republicans plan to run fake Democrats in the 
primaries leading up to the Walker recall election. See Patrick Marley, GAB Sets Historic 
Recall Elections; GOP to Field Fake Democrats, MiLWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Mar. 30, 2012), 
http://www.jsonline.com/news/statepolitics/gab-sets-historic-recall-elections-for-walker-
kleefisch-t04q7k6-145152265 .html. 
41. Monica Davey, Republicans Hold On to Wisconsin Senate After Recall Vote, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2011), http://nytimes.com/2011!08/10/us/politics/lOwisconsin.html. 
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Nor will the effort to recall Governor Walker, which began on 
November 15, 2011 and will culminate in a June 8, 2012 recall elec-
tion,42 lead to a repeal of Act 10. Though the recall supporters 
had only sixty days to collect 540,000 petition signatures to recall 
Walket; the Wisconsin Government Accountability Board certified over 
900,000 recall signatures.43 
Yet, even if the recall of Governor Walker is successful, it will 
likely not alter the continuing effects of Act 10. This is because, in 
order to repeal the law, one of three events will have to happen. First, 
Democratic majorities will likely have to be elected in both the State 
Senate and Assembly. Although, in the Senate, this may happen in 
due course through additional 1·ecalls and elections, it is unlikely to 
happen in the near future in the Assembly where Republican majori-
ties are more substantial. 44 A Democratic governor would be power-
less to undo the damage to public-sector unions without majorities in 
both legislative houses that are willing to overturn Act 10. 
Second, supporters of public-sector unions can follow an approach 
other states have used by seeking to enshrine the right of public-sector 
bargaining in the Wisconsin Constitution.45 '!'his approach would have 
the advantage of not only immediately repealing Act 10, but making it 
less likely that attacks against public unions could take place again in 
the future. Although this appears to lead to the best results for those 
who support public-sector bargaining, the process is even more cum-
bersome than the recall effort and, of course, there is no guarantee 
that Wisconsin state voters would support such an initiative.46 
42. Governor Walker, along with Lieutenant Governor Rebecca Kleefisch and four 
additional Republican state senators, will be subject to the 2012 recall process. The re· 
call primaries will be held on May 8, 2012, and the general recall election will take place 
on June 5, 2012. See Tim Jones, Al.l·Out Walker War Ahead as Wisconsin Board Ap-
proves Recall, BLOOMBERG BusJNESSWB&K (Mar. 30, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/ 
news/2012-03-30/all-out-walker-war-Jooms-as-wisconsin-recall-uncertainty-ends. 
43. See id. 540,000 signatures represents twenty-five percent of the people who 
voted in the November 2010 gubernatorial election. 
44. Redistricting bas made legislative change even more unlikely as "(al three-
judge panel of the U.S. District CourL for the Eastern District of Wisconsin ... upheld all 
but two state legislative districts drawn by a Republican·controlled Wisco1tsin Legisla-
ture. It also upheld a congressional redistricting map." See Joe Forward, Federal Court 
Panel Largely Upholds Republican·Drawn Legislative Redistricting Maps, ST. BAR W1s. 
(Mar. 22, 2012), http://ww-.Y.wisbar.org/AM!l'emplate.cfm?Section=News&Template=/ 
CMJContentDisplay.cfm&ContentiD=l09866. See also id. ("The panel lamented on the 
secrecy and partisan nature of this cycle's redistricting process."). 
45. For example, Missouri has a right to organize and to engage 'in collective bar-
gaining in its state constitution. Joseph E. Slater, Lessons from the Public Sector: Sug-
gestions and a Calltion, 94 MARq. L. RJ>v. 917, 927 (2011) ("In 1945, Missouri added the 
following clause to its state constitution: 'IE]mployees shall have the right to organize 
and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.'") (quoting 
Mo. Const. art. I, § 29). 
46. See Steve Miller, Govern Wisconsitl: Amending the Wisconsin Constitution, 
W1s. LEGJS. Re~'RRENCE BuREAu (2008), http://legis.wisconsin.govllr1Ygw/gw_26.pdf (stating 
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The third, and final, approach47 depends on litigation in the fed-
eral courts. Unlike the open meetings law litigation in Wisconsin state 
courts, this litigation more broadly argues that Act 10 is in violation of 
federal constitutional rights of free speech and Equal Protection. 48 On 
March 30, 2012, the district court upheld the anti-collective bargain-
ing provisions against an Equal Protection attack, and struck down 
the dues checkoff and recertification provisions as in violation of 
Equal Protection and First Amendment free speech rights. 49 More spe-
cifically, the court held: 
[P]lainti:ffs have not met their burden with t·espect to their Equal 
Protection challenge to Act lO's ptincipal provisions limiting the col-
lective bargaining rights of general employees and their unions. The 
State, however, has ·not articulated, and the court is now satisfied 
cannot articulate, a rational basis for picking and choosing from 
among public unions, those (1) that must annually obtain an abso-
lute majority of its voluntary members to remain in existence or 
(2) that are entitled to voluntary, assistance with fundraising by 
automatic deduction, at least not a rational basis that does not 
offend the First Amendment. So long as the State of Wisconsin con-
tinues to afford ordinary certification and dues deductions to manda-
tory public safety unions with sweeping bargaining rights, there is 
no rational basis to deny those rights to voluntal'Y general unions 
with severely restricted bargaining rights. 5° 
Interestingly, the unions attacking Act 10 did not even challenge 
it on freedom of association grounds because the United States, unlike 
Canada, 51 does not have a history of protecting constitutional rights to 
picket or to bargain collectively.52 In any event, it expected that both 
sides to the dispute will now continue this litigation in the Seventh 
constitutional amendments must pass both chambers of the legislature in separate legis-
lati.ve sessions). 
4 7. In addition, there is a fourth approach, which would have Wisconsin public em-
ployees shut down the state government by engaging in an unlawful general strike. 
Although there was some early discussion about such a possibility among t he unions, a 
general strike never did occur. Grace Wyler, Wisconsin Unions Call for Gen.eral Strilre, 
Bus. INSiDER (Feb. 22, 2011), http:/Jarticles.businessinsider.com/2011-02-22/politics/ 
30092755_1_general-strike-bill-address-voters. 
48. See Complaint, Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, No. 3:11-cv-00428-wmc 
(W.D. Wis., filed June 15, 2011), http://wispolitics.com/1006/110615_Complaint_ 
M0460041_l.pdf. 
49. See Wis. Educ. Ass'n Council v. Walker, 11-cv-428-wmc, 2012 WL 1068790, 
at *1 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 30, 2012). 
50. Id. 
51. See Ontario (AG) v. Fl'aser, 2011 SCC 20 [2011) 2 S.C.R. 3 (Can.) (discussing 
constitutional right to organize and collectively bargaining under Canadian law). 
52. See, e.g., Smith v. Ark. State Highway Emp., 441 U.S. 463, 465 & n.2 (1979) 
(per curiam) ("[T]he .First Amendment does not impose any affirmative obligation on the 
govexnment to listen to respond or, in this context, to recognize the association and bar-
gain with it."); Dorchey v. Rro1sas, 272 U.S. 306, 311 (1926) (holding that there is no abso-
lute right to strike under the federal Constitution). 
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Circuit Court of Appeals, and it is unclear to what extent non-public 
safety public unions will continue to be burdened by Act 10 in the 
future. 
III. Conclusion 
With some notable exceptions, including Illinois,53 most govern-
ments, including the federal government and Wisconsin, have taken 
an austerity approach to their current economic woes. Under this ap-
proach, the government contends that the only remedy is to cut gov-
ernment services to citizens and, by extension, public employment and 
compensation. In this vein, Governor Walker has pledged that he will 
not, under any circumstances, raise taxes. 54 Rather, he has cut taxes 
for corporations by $130 million as a way to spur job growth in the 
state. 55 Of course, cutting corporate taxes requires additional spend-
ing cuts and public employees are the perfect target when government 
services need to be cut. They make up a relatively small percentage of 
the total voting population and yet are perceived by voters to enjoy lu-
crative compensation packages, including great health care insurance 
and pension plans. 
Although it is generally true that public employees in Wisconsin 
and other states have more generous health care plans and pension 
plans, the overall compensation of employees tends to be less than 
comparable private-sector workers. This is because compensation is 
comprised of both wages and benefits, and wages for public-sector 
workers in Wisconsin are less than comparable private-sector workers. 
In the end, recent studies have shown that when looking at wages and 
benefits together, public-sector workers make four to seven percent 
less than comparable private-sector employees. 56 
Furthermore, public employees, regardless of their ability to pro-
test and bring public attention to the attacks on their unions, have a 
mixed record in convincing fellow citizens to support their unions. On 
the one hand, voters in Ohio recently voted by referendum, sixty-two 
percent to thirty-eight percent, to repeal a similar anti-collective 
53. Mark Guarino, Illinois Tax Increase: Why Lawmakers Passed 66 Percent In-
come-Tax Hike, CHRISTIAN Scr. MoNITOR (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/ 
2011/0112/Illinois-tax-increase-why-lawmakers-passed-66-percent-income-tax-hike. 
54. Walker has signed Grover Norquist's pledge not to raise taxes under any cir-
cumstances. Alison Fitzgerald, No-Tax "Zealot" Norquist Emerges as Biggest Barrier to 
US. Deficit Deal, BLOOMBERG (May 23, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-05-
24/norquist-emerges-as-barrier-to-u-s-debt-deal.html. 
55. Editorial, supra note 8. In the period between February 2011 and February 
2012, however, "[t]he largest over-the-year percentage decrease in employment occurred 
in Wisconsin (-0.6 percent)." U.S. DEP'T OF LAB., BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., NEWS RELEASE: RE-
GIONAL AND STATE EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT, Mar. 30, 2012, http://op.bna.com/ 
dlrcases.nsf/idllswr-8svmaf/$File/State%20Jobs%20Feb.pdf. 
56. Keefe, supra note 12. 
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bargaining bill. 57 Wisconsin does not have such a referendum process. 
Moreover, even if the ongoing recall efforts of Republican state sena-
tors and Governor Walker are successful, as discussed above, such an 
outcome will likely not lead to the repeal of Act 10. Although public-
sector unions have had some success attacking Act 10 constitutionally 
in federal court, so far what victories there have been have been par-
tial ones. 
At the end of the day, Governor Walker, and his allies in the legis-
lature, have chosen to respond to budget deficits caused by the state's 
economic crisis by scapegoating public-sector unions. The saga of the 
enactment of Wisconsin Act 10, therefore, is a simple story about an 
attack on public unions for exclusively political purposes. Yet, even 
daunting economic problems, like the ones currently faced by Wiscon-
sin, can be successfully addressed by governments without attacking 
the basic workplace and democratic rights of public-sector workers. 
The hope is that in the coming months and years that Wisconsin and 
other states find less partisan ways to get their financial houses in 
order. 
57. Rachel Weiner, Issue 2 Falls, Ohio Collective Bargaining Law Repealed, WASH. 
PoST (Nov. 8, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/post/issue-2-falls-ohio-
collective-bargaining-law-repealed/2011/11/08/giQAyZOU3M_blog.html (noting that in 
addition to Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker, Texas Governor Rick Perry and Ohio Gov-
ernor John Kasich have signed the pledge). 
